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This paper studies a firm’s optimal capital structure in an environment where the
firm’s stock price serves as a public signal for its default risk. In equilibrium,
the number of traders who find it profitable to trade the firm’s stock increases
as the firm issues more equity. In turn, the precision with which the stock price
communicates the firm’s fundamental to bond investors increases in the num-
ber of equity investors. Thus, through its capital structure, firms can internalize
the informational externality that stock prices exert on bond yields. Strong firms
therefore issue equity to reduce borrowing costs.
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1 Introduction
Lehman’s 2008 bankruptcy may have come as a surprise to those bondholders who
believed in its A-ratings. It was less of a surprise to the bondholders who observed
that Lehman’s stock price had fallen from 62.19 at the beginning of 2008 to its 3.65
low on September 12, 2008, the day before Lehman filed for bankruptcy. Similarly,
AIG’s A-ratings were not more informative during the days before its bailout. The
stock price, which had fallen by more than 90 percent in that year, provided a more
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informative signal. In both cases, the stock price served as a timely, costless, and
arguably unbiased monitoring device for bondholders.
We study a firm’s optimal capital structure choice in models with default and
asymmetric information. Our model shows that the informational content of pub-
licly observable prices is a crucial aspect that shapes a firm’s financing decisions.
In the present model, firms choose their capital structure to internalize the infor-
mational externality that stock prices have on equilibrium bond yields. Our main
finding is that the informational spillover from stock price signals to bond yields
makes it optimal for a firm that is financially strong to issue more equity and less
debt than it would if it were financially weak. This finding relies on a positive
relation between the informativeness of the firm’s stock price and the amount of
equity issued: as the firm issues more equity, it incentivizes more equity investors
to research and trade the firm’s stock. In turn, the firm’s stock price becomes more
informative and communicates the firm’s strong financial situation more clearly to
bond investors, who use the information contained in the stock price to calculate the
firm’s default risk and the corresponding equilibrium bond yield. In contrast with
models where the firm’s capital structure choice communicates insider knowledge
to outside investors,1 the present paper analyzes how different capital structures
facilitate the information exchange between outside investors.
We use a stylized framework where a firm issues bonds B and sells a number of
shares K to raise an exogenously given revenue I . The firm’s objective is to mini-
mize its cost of capital. The model is sequential, and at the beginning of time, the
firm announces a capital structure .K;B/. Subsequently, the stock (equity) mar-
ket opens and the shares K are sold to risk-averse investors at a market-clearing
price p. Stock investors observe private signals about the firm’s fundamental  ,
where  determines the payoffs on the firm’s equity and debt. The stock price then
aggregates and publicizes the investor’s private information and partially reveals
the firm’s strength  . Subsequently, bond investors use the stock price p to cal-
culate the firm’s conditional default probability. In turn, bonds are traded at the
corresponding market-clearing interest rate r . The firm’s true strength  is revealed
in the final period where bond and equity returns materialize. Bonds pay a net re-
turn r if the fundamental is strong (  0). Otherwise, the firm declares bankruptcy
and bond investors take a loss.
1.1 Related Literature
In terms of the survey on capital structures by Harris and Raviv (1991), the present
analysis is closest to models of asymmetric information, where the firm’s choice
of a capital structure transmits insider information to outside investors. However,
instead of a transfer of information from insiders to outsiders, the present analy-
sis focuses on the transfer of information between outsiders, i.e., bond and stock
investors.
1 See Harris and Raviv (1991, pp. 306–315), for a survey of models where various
aspects of asymmetric information shape optimal capital structures.
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Closest to our model, Harris and Raviv (1990) develop a capital structure model
where the firms’ indebtedness influences information revelation.2 Harris and Ra-
viv (1990) assume that firms use a technology to produce output that is unknown
to outside investors. However, outside investors do observe whether the firm can
service its debt. That is, if a deeply indebted firm can meet its obligations, outside
investors learn that it must be very productive. Accordingly, strong firms indebt
themselves to communicate their strength. The opposite is true in our model, where
a stock price, which aggregates dispersed private information, publicizes the firm’s
strength. That is, unlike Harris and Raviv (1990), we argue that the stock, rather
than the bond, market is the main source of public information. This assumption
is validated by a large empirical literature that shows that the stock market leads
bond market returns: Kwan (1996), Forte and Peña (2009), Longstaff, Mithal, and
Neis (2003), Norden and Weber (2009). In our two-period model, this is captured
by the assumption that the stock market opens earlier than the bond market. Re-
garding this stock market, we employ the standard noise-trader models, Grossman
and Stiglitz (1976, 1980), Green (1975), Hellwig (1980), and Vives (2008), which
emphasize the aggregation of information.
Our paper is also related to the literature on security design. In particular, Boot
and Thakor (1993) study a firm’s incentive to divide its revenue stream into a
risky “information sensitive equity claim” and a safe “information insensitive debt
claim.” The main similarity to the current model lies in the prediction that strong
firms design their securities to amplify the informativeness of the price at which
risky claims trade.3 Firms in the model of Boot and Thakor (1993) cannot default.
Put differently, the probability of a firm defaulting on its debt is always zero, and
thus independent of the stock price. The effects of stock prices on default probabil-
ities, which we study, are therefore excluded by construction in Boot and Thakor
(1993). Finally, Che and Sethi (2013) study the cost of risky debt in models where
agents use derivatives to trade default risks.
Our model generates several testable implications. We show that firms that be-
lieve that their fundamental is strong will issue equity to communicate their finan-
cial strength to investors. Namely, strong firms should operate with low leverage.
This is consistent with the findings of Chadha and Sharma (2015), Pouraghajan
et al. (2012), Olokoyo (2013), Twairesh (2014), Ahmed Sheikh and Wang (2013),
2 See also Calomiris and Kahn (1991) for a related model. Admati et al. (2010,
pp. 28–31) discuss the governance and informational role of a firm’s debt. Albagli, Hell-
wig, and Tsyvinski (2011) develop a model where a firm interacts with stock prices that
aggregate the investors’ dispersed private information. In their model, however, firms is-
sue no debt.
3 Boot and Thakor (1993) discuss a noise-trader model with risk-neutral investors who
can decide to purchase fully revealing private information on the firm’s fundamental. This
fundamental can take a high value Nx >0 or a low value x >0. The firm decides whether to
sell one risky asset that yields either a high value Nx >0 or a low value x >0. Alternatively,
it can sell a safe asset that always yields x >0, and a risky asset that yields either Nxx >0
or nothing. The safe asset always pays x, and thus trades at price x regardless of the
informational content of the risky asset’s price.
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and Mireku, Mensah, and Ogoe (2014), who identify a significant and negative
correlation between leverage and firm performance in emerging markets. Simi-
larly, our result – that stock prices of firms with a large stock market capitalization
predict future earnings and dividends better than stock prices of firms with a small
market capitalization – is in line with the empirical findings of Collins, Kothari,
and Rayburn (1987).
The importance of the information channel described in the current paper should
vary across firms. Namely, the stock price signal should be less important for firms
whose financial strength is closely correlated with other observable market indica-
tors. The car industry may be seen as an example where a firm’s performance relies
heavily on the overall business sentiment. Moreover, in the case of, e.g., Ford, GM,
and Chrysler, the situation of, say, Ford can also be inferred from the stock prices
of its two peers. Hence, the role of Ford’s stock price is more subdued. Conversely,
the effect described here should be of great importance to firms that produce spe-
cialized products. Indeed, Titman and Wessels (1988) find that firms with unique
or specialized products have relatively low debt ratios.4 Finally, Baker and Wurgler
(2002) show that low-leverage firms are those that raised funds when their mar-
ket valuations were high.5 Conversely, highly leveraged firms raised funds when
their market valuations were low. This observation is consistent with the negative
relation between financial strength and leverage that our model implies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline the model.
In section 3, we derive the main results. In a separate section 4, we comment on
our assumptions and replace some of them to demonstrate the robustness of our
findings. Finally, we present a more general specification for the bond market. Sec-
tion 5 offers concluding remarks.
2 Model
Our model consists of the firm, a unit measure of potential stock investors, and a
unit measure of bond investors. The returns earned by equity and bond investors
depend on the unknown financial strength of the firm,  . In our baseline specifi-
cation, this fundamental  is exogenous and independent of the capital structure.
Positive values of  correspond to the case when the firm is solvent; the firm’s bond
investors then receive a net return r , determined endogenously as a market-clearing
rate. Negative  corresponds to the state of firm’s default, where investors incur a
loss. Regarding equity returns, we study a standard CARA-normal model, where
. p/ki is an agent’s return who bought a (possibly negative) number ki of shares
at price p.
The current payoff structure emphasizes that a higher expected  makes default
less likely, which is what we require for our results. Regarding equity payoff, how-
4 Uniqueness is measured by the firms’ expenditures on research and development,
their selling expenses, and the rate at which employees voluntarily leave their jobs.
5 As measured by the market-to-book ratio.
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ever, we note that we use the payoff structure of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and
Hellwig (1980), which violates limited liability. Regarding bonds, the current spec-
ification implies that bondholders get paid in full even if the amount of resource
is below B CrB, where B is the total debt outstanding; this is not consistent with
a traditional budget constraint. In section 4.3, we show that the incorporation of a
resource constraint regarding the payoffs to bonds strengthens the effects that we
derive for the simplified setting.
The model is characterized by the following time line:
Period 0. The firm decides on the capital structure .K;B/ that minimizes the ex-
pected cost of capital, Ef ŒC  D Ef ŒK.p/CBr, subject to the revenue constraint
I D Ef ŒpK CB, where Ef denotes the expectation operator associated with the
firm’s beliefs over  . We assume that the firm believes that  > 0 with probabil-
ity one.6 After the firm announces a particular plan, .K;B/, equity investors decide
whether to participate or to abstain from the equity market. In equilibrium, the mass
of participating agents, , depends on the size K of the equity market. Finally, eq-
uity investors receive private signals xi on the firm’s strength and submit demand
schedules.
Period 1. The equity market opens, and an equilibrium stock price p is observed.
The debt market opens after the equity market, and bonds are traded at the equilib-
rium yield r , which depends on p.
Period 2. The firm’s unknown fundamental  is revealed, and all payoffs are re-
alized.
6 A large literature argues in favor of the assumption that the firm is overly optimistic:
Heaton (2002); Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008); Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011);
Goel and Thakor (2008); Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013).
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Due to the information spillover between stock market and bond market, we
solve the model recursively. Proceeding in line with backward induction, we begin
with the bond market; subsequently, we introduce the equity market. Finally, we
analyze the ex ante decision .K;B/ of the firm.
2.1 Debt Market
When the bond market opens, bond investors use the stock price p to compute the
probability that the firm is solvent and form their demand. The demand for bonds,
BD.p;r/, is given by a continuously differentiable function of two arguments: the
probability p  Pr.  0jp/ with which the firm is solvent, and the net interest
rate r . A greater probability that the firm is solvent (i.e., does not default on its
debt) implies a higher demand for bonds. Bond demand is also increasing in the
net interest rate r that bond investors receive if the firm is solvent:
@BD
@p
> 0;
@BD
@r
>0:
The demand for bonds, BD , would result from payoff maximization by the mass
of investors in the bond market. We do not specify the underlying optimization
problem in this paper, but Gorelkina and Kuhle (2013) show that the demand func-
tion can come from the maximization of CARA utilities by bond investors who
face a piecewise-constant payoff to debt.
Moving on to the other properties of the demand function, we assume that the
demand is negative when the interest rate is zero, since there is a risk of default on
repaying the principal (p <1 for any real p):
BD.p;0/ < 0:
We define the limit values of the bond demand function to ensure that the bond
market clears for all price signals:
lim
r!1
BD.p;r/ D 1; lim
r!1
BD.p;r/ D 1:
For a given bond supply B, market clearing requires
(1) BD.p;r/ D B:
Differentiation of (1) yields the bond market’s comparative statics:
Lemma 1 The equilibrium rate of return r decreases in the firm’s survival proba-
bility: @r=@p < 0. Returns increase in the debt supply: @r=@B >0.
2.2 Equity Market
Equity is traded in the standard linear CARA-normal noise-trader market. Equity
investors can engage in short selling, and there are no borrowing constraints. They
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hold an uninformative prior and receive noisy private signals xi D  Cxi , which
reveal the true  with precision ˛x D 1=2x . Private noise i  N .0;1/ is idiosyn-
cratic.7 Finally, noise-trader demand for the firm’s equity is given by "", where
" N .0;1/.
To characterize the market price signal, we guess and verify that there exists a
linear price function, p D 1C2"Cc, where 1, 2, c are the coefficients that need
to be determined. Regarding  , the price contains the same information as a signal
Z  .pc/=1 D  C .2=1/". Given the price function, we can characterize indi-
vidual demands based on the information xi ;Z. Investors choose their individual
stock holdings ki to maximize expected CARA utility U.y/D e	y , where 	 is the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion:8
ki D argmax
ki
°
E
h
e	.p/ki ˇˇxi ;Z
i±
D argmax
ki
°
e	EŒ.p/ki jxi ;Z.	
2=2/varŒ.p/ki jxi ;Z
±
D argmax
ki
²
	

˛x
˛
xi C ˛z
˛
Z p

ki  	
2
2˛
k2i
³
;
where ˛x and ˛z D 21=22 are the precisions of the signals xi and Z, respectively,
and ˛ D˛x C˛z . Consequently, the individual demand function becomes
(2) kdi D
˛
	

˛x
˛
xi C ˛z
˛
Z p

:
In the appendix section A.1, we use (2) to (i) compute aggregate demand for
a given mass  of investors and (ii) determine the price function’s coefficients as
1 D 1 and 2 D 	"=˛x. Concerning the stock price’s informational content, this
implies that
p D  C˛1=2z "
K	
˛
; Z D  C˛1=2z ":
Importantly, the precision ˛z D ˛2x2=	22" , with which Z reveals the true funda-
mental  , increases in the mass  of equity investors.
2.2.1 Equilibrium Participation.
Equity investors have to decide between (i) receiving a signal and buying shares,
on the one hand, and (ii) receiving utility U0, which represents an outside option,
on the other. Agents are thus just indifferent between the two options if
(3) EŒEŒU jZ;xi  D U0:
7 Hammond and Sun (2008) characterize the validity of a framework with a random
macro state and idiosyncratic micro shocks via Monte Carlo simulation as well as event-
wise measurable conditional probabilities.
8 See Raiffa and Schlaifer (2000, p. 250) for the standard results on prior and posterior
distributions of normally distributed variables that we use throughout the paper.
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In the appendix section A.2, we show that the agent’s ex ante expected utility in (3)
can be rewritten as a function of market size jKj and participation :
(4) EŒEŒU jZ;xi  DF.jKj;/; @F
@jKj > 0;
@F
@
< 0:
For a given mass  of traders, trade becomes more profitable as the firm issues
more shares. Trade becomes less profitable as the mass  of competing traders
increases. Hence, we have the following:
Proposition 1 The mass  of equity investors and the price signal’s precision
˛z D˛2x2=	22" increase with the equity market’s depth jKj.
Proof It follows from (3) and (4) that the break-even level of  must satisfy U0 
F.jKj;/. By the implicit-function theorem, we have @=@jKj D .@F=@jKj/=
.@F=@/>0. Q.E.D.
That is, as the size of the stock market increases, there are larger rents, which
attract additional equity investors to the market. Hence, the announcement of dif-
ferent capital structures .K;B/ influences the price signal’s precision and thus the
strength of the informational spillover.
2.3 Stock Price Signal and Bond Returns
Once we recall that the stock investors’ mass  increases the informativeness ˛z D
2˛2x=	
22" of the price signal Z D  C "=
p
˛z , bond investors can compute the
firm’s default probability p as a function of Z. This yields the following
Proposition 2 The cost of debt, r , decreases (increases) in the mass of equity
investors, , if the fundamental  is positive (negative).
Proposition 2 (for the proof, see the appendix section A.4) shows that a deeper
equity market, in which more investors collect information about the firm’s un-
known fundamental, reduces the noise trader’s influence and thus causes the stock
price to reveal the firm’s fundamental with greater precision to bond investors.
3 Optimal Capital Structure
As the firm chooses its capital structure, it anticipates the interaction between the
stock and bond markets. In particular, the firm knows that the mass of equity in-
vestors and thus the informativeness of the price signal changes with the amount
of equity issued, as in section 2.2.1. That is, every capital structure choice implies
a distinct informational environment. In this section, we show that a firm that be-
lieves that it is strong issues more equity and less debt. Put differently, strong firms
amplify the precision with which their fundamental strength is communicated to
bond investors. This reduces expected borrowing costs.
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The firm is assumed to be risk-neutral. Moreover, it requires external financing
I > 0, which it can attract by issuing shares K and debt B. The firm announces
its ex ante optimal capital structure K;B at t D 0 before markets open. That is, the
firm chooses its capital structure subject to the anticipated informational interaction
between the two markets described above. Finally, the firm believes that it will not
default, i.e., it believes  > 0. The expectation operator associated with the firm’s
beliefs is denoted Ef Œ , where the superscript f refers to the firm.9
Taking into account the equilibria in the bond and equity markets, the firm’s
optimization problem reads
(5) min
K;B
C D min
K;B
Ef Œ. p/K CrB
subject to
Ef ŒpK CB D I (revenue constraint),
D .K/ (equilibrium participation),
p D  C 1p
˛z
" 	K
˛
; ˛ D ˛x C˛z; ˛z D ˛
2
x
2
	22"
(equity market equilibrium),
r D r.B;/ (debt market equilibrium),
(6)
where p D p.K;/ is the solution for the equity market equilibrium (A3), and
r D r.B;/ is the bond market equilibrium (1). The problem (5)–(6) yields a first-
order condition for the firm’s optimal capital structure:
(7) dC
dK
D @C
@K„ƒ‚…
direct effect
C @C
@
@
@K„ ƒ‚ …
info externality
D 0:
The condition (7) singles out two effects. First, there is a direct effect, which de-
scribes how issuing equity impacts the cost of capital for a given information struc-
ture. Second, there is the informational externality, which shows that the stock
price’s informational content varies with the firm’s capital structure. Regarding the
direct effect, we note:
Lemma 2 For any positive revenue I , there exists a finite pair K > 0;B T 0
that solves @C=@K D 0. This capital structure minimizes the firm’s capital costs
for every exogenously given mass  of equity investors. If I is sufficiently high, we
have B >0 and K > 0.
9 In equilibrium, stock and bond investors can use the optimal plan .K;B/ to make
inferences about the firm’s belief f over  . As we point out in the introduction, we assume
that the firm’s belief is uninformative (to investors), to separate the effects of information
spillovers from stock prices from the signaling effects.
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Lemma 2 (for the proof, see the appendix section A.3) describes the capital
structure choice of a firm that does not internalize the informational externality that
stock prices exert on bond yields. A firm that internalizes this externality chooses
a capital structure that solves (7):
Proposition 3 To internalize the informational externality, the firm chooses an
optimal capital structure .K;B/ 2 R2
C
, such that K < K, B > B, and
.K/ <.K/.
Proposition 3 (for the proof, see the appendix section A.4) shows that the firm
has an incentive to issue equity to internalize the informational externality. That
is, as the firm issues more equity, the stock price conveys its strong financial po-
sition more clearly to bond investors. This reduces expected borrowing costs. To
understand Proposition 3, we discuss the informational externality in greater detail:
@C
@
@
@K
D 

1CEf

r C @r
@B
B

	K2
˛22

˛x C 3˛
2
x
2
	22"

„ ƒ‚ …
C
@
@K„ƒ‚…
C
CEf

@r
@
@
@K
B
„ ƒ‚ …

<0:
(8)
The first term in (8) shows that increases in stock supply raise participation in
the stock market. This increases the stock price’s informational content, and thus
stock investors who also condition their demand on the stock price’s informational
content take larger positions. That is, there are more and better-informed buyers,
so that a given stock supply K can be sold at a higher price
	K2
˛22

˛x C 3˛
2
x
2
	22"

@
@K
:
Moreover, Ef Œr C .@r=@B/B reflects that this increase in stock prices allows one
to reduce debt, which in turn reduces borrowing costs on debt, B. The second
term in (8) shows that the information externality, which goes from the stock price
to the bond yield, strengthens as the firm issues additional stocks: The stock price
communicates the firm’s strong financial position more clearly to bond investors,
which reduces borrowing costs.
In summary, we find that the firm issues equity to increase the number of in-
vestors who find it profitable to research and trade the firm’s stock. This makes
the equity market deeper and increases the precision with which the stock price
communicates the firm’s fundamental. In turn, bond investors who learn the firm’s
strength from the stock price are willing to lend at lower rates.
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4 Discussion
A number of our previous assumptions were made to simplify the exposition. First,
we discuss the assumption that the stock market rather than the bond market is the
main source of public information. Second, we show that the firm’s dividend  , and
thus the survival probability p , can be derived from a consistent budget constraint.
Finally, we present a more general specification for the bond market.
4.1 Direction of the Spillover
Currently, the stock price is the main source of public information. In principle,
it is possible to construct an alternative model where bond investors research the
firm’s financial strength and stock investors use the equilibrium yield to infer the
firm’s fundamental. Alternatively, we could also study the intermediate case where
both p and r carry information. While such analysis is possible, we believe that the
current specification, where the stock price signal influences bond yields, is likely
the more relevant one. Empirical evidence suggests that, even though many firms
operate with a capital structure where the value of the debt far exceeds the value
of the equity, it is the stock price and not the bond yield (of some reference matu-
rity) that is published most prominently in the media. The financial data provided
by Google Finance, Reuters, or Bloomberg make it straightforward to observe the
latest stock prices; at the same time, it is difficult to inquire about bond yields.
Moreover, a firm’s bond market is fragmented into bonds with various maturities.
The market for a particular issue is accordingly very small compared to the more
homogeneous equity that is traded in the stock market. According to Gebhardt,
Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005), research on bonds is mostly limited to the
firms covered by rating agencies, and those do not revise a firm’s bond ratings as
often as an equity analyst might change her forecasts and recommendations. Empir-
ically, Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005) show that stock prices adjust
to the firm-specific information more quickly than do bond prices. Furthermore,
Kwan (1996) finds that lagged stock returns have explanatory power for current
bond yield changes, while current stock returns are unrelated to lagged bond yield
changes. Forte and Peña (2009) confirm this finding on a sample of North Ameri-
can and European companies. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2003) and Norden and
Weber (2009) use different regression techniques and reach the same conclusion.
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2009)
and Gorelkina and Kuhle (2013, pp. 30–34) show that the coarse (the linear) pay-
out profile of debt (equity) discourages bond investors from researching a firm’s
financial position. On the contrary, equity investors have a strong incentive to ac-
quire the detailed information that is aggregated and publicized through the stock
price.
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4.2 Segmentation of Investors
We assume that bond and stock investors belong to two different groups. Alterna-
tively, we could assume that there is a group of bond investors and another group
of investors who decide to participate either in the stock market or in the bond
market.
For our results to hold, it suffices that the mass  of investors who trade the stock
is increasing in equity issued. That is, an increase in the amount of equity issued
would have to increase investors’ utility in the stock market and decrease utility
from participating in the bond market. In Proposition 1, we have already established
that increases in the amount of equity issued increase the rents in the stock market.
When the survival probability of the firm is fixed, the same is true of the bond
market by Lemma 1, i.e., if the number of bonds sold decreases, the interest rates
and thus the buyers’ utility decrease. By the law of iterated expectations, ex ante
utility in the bond market also decreases in the supply of bonds; thus traders would
migrate from bonds to equity until the expected utility from participating in the two
markets is equalized. We obtain that increases in equity issued would reduce the
number of bonds and that investors would therefore migrate from debt to equity,
and our results would carry over.
4.3 The Firm’s Resource Constraint and General Bond Demand
To simplify the exposition in the main text, we treated the firm’s dividend  as inde-
pendent of the capital structure. In this section, we show that the results are indeed
strengthened once we add a consistent budget constraint. To do so, we assume that
the firm’s aggregate resources are given by Y . In turn, these resources are used to
service the debt B and to pay a dividend  per share:
(9) Y D K C .1Cr/B ,  D Y
K
 .1Cr/B
K
:
The comparative statics of the equity market obtain as before, once agents re-
ceive noisy private signals over the new  .10 In the appendix section A.5, we show
that the informational externality, which induces firms to issue more equity and
less debt, is strengthened once dividends  , and thus the firm’s survival probabil-
ity p , depend on the interest rate as in (9). In particular, we find that the reduction
of expected interest rates, which is associated with more precise stock prices, now
also reduces the default probability 1p.
To complete the discussion of the resource constraint (9), it remains to discuss
the implications for bond demand. For our results to hold, it is sufficient that de-
10 The key observation in this context is that the return r.p/ is a deterministic function
of the stock price. Hence, equity investors who condition their demand on the informa-
tional content of the stock price p always correctly anticipate the interest rate r.p/, so that
there is no additional nonlinearity in the equity investors’ utility maximization problem.
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mand is given by a continuously differentiable function BD.p;r/:
(10) @B
D
@p
>0;
dBD
dr
D @B
D
@p
@p
@
@
@r
C @B
D
@r
>0;
where  is defined as in (9). The assumptions regarding the demand function’s
derivatives indicate that, for every given interest rate, demand increases in the
firm’s survival probability. Moreover, increases in the rate of return increase bond
demand. In equilibrium, where the supply of bonds is B, we have
BD.p;r/ D B , r D r.B;p/ >0; @r
@B
>0;
@r
@p
<0;
where the signs of @r=@B, and @r=@p, which are required for our main Proposi-
tion 3, follow from (10).
5 Conclusion
The present paper provides a simple equilibrium model in which the firm’s stock
price serves as a rating device for investors who buy its debt. The main motivation
for our analysis lies in the observation that stock investors, as opposed to rating
agencies (which rely on fees from the firms they rate), have no incentive to mis-
report their information on the firm’s financial position. That is, they do not buy
stocks at inflated prices to mislead bond investors.
To study the spillover from stock price signals to bond yields, we have assumed
the perspective of a firm that minimizes its capital cost subject to the informational
connection between the bond and stock markets. In a first step, we have shown
that a firm that is financially strong benefits from an informative stock price that
communicates its financial strength clearly to bond investors, who rely on price
signals to infer the firm’s default probability. In a second step, we endogenize the
strength of the informational spillover. In an economy where equity investors can
choose whether to take a position in the firm’s stock, increases in the amount of
equity issued incentivize more stock investors to trade the firm’s stock, which in-
creases the stock price signal’s precision. Hence, the strength of the informational
spillover varies with different capital structures. Consequently, firms have an incen-
tive to choose their capital structure to internalize the informational externality that
stock prices exert on bond yields. Firms with a strong fundamental will therefore
issue equity to generate stock price signals that communicate their strong financial
position on average more clearly to bond investors.
The contribution of this paper is therefore twofold. First, it shows how the infor-
mational content of a firm’s stock price influences its borrowing cost. Second, we
find that strong firms have an incentive to issue equity, which increases their stock
price’s informational content and reduces their borrowing costs.
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Appendix
A.1 Stock Market Price
Using (2), we write the aggregate demand KD as
KD D
Z
Œ0;
ki d i C"" D ˛
	

˛x
˛
 C ˛z
˛
Z p

C"":
Market clearing requires that
(A1) KD D KS , ˛
	

˛x
˛
 C ˛z
˛
Z p

D K "":
To close the argument, we now resubstitute Z D .pc/=1 and calculate 1 and 2.
First, we solve (A1) for p to obtain
(A2) p D ˛x
˛˛z=1  C
	"
.˛˛z=1/ "C
1
1˛1=˛z

c C K	1
˛z

:
Comparison of (A2) with our initial guess, p D 1 C2"Cc indicates that 1, 2
must satisfy
1 D ˛x
˛˛z=1 ; 2 D
	"
.˛˛z=1/ ; c D
1
1˛1=˛z

c C K	1
˛z

I ˛ D ˛x C˛z:
The solution to the first equality is 1 D 1; thus 2 D 	"=˛x and c D K	=˛.
Accordingly, p and Z D .pc/=1 D  C .2=1/" are given by
(A3) p D  C˛1=2z "
K	
˛
; Z D  C˛1=2z "; ˛z D
˛2x
2
	22"
:
Q.E.D.
A.2 Stock Market Participation
The agent’s ex ante expected utility is
U ei .;K/ D EU.. p/ki /:
Using the properties of CARA utility functions and the law of iterated expectations,
we have
U ei .;K/ D EŒEŒexp.	. p/ki /jxi ;Z:
Since ki , p are constant conditional on .xi ;Z/ and  is conditionally normally
distributed, we can write
U ei .;K/D E

exp

	.EŒ jxi ;Zp/ki C 1
2
	2k2i var. jxi ;Z/

:
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Denoting EŒ jxi ;Z D i , var. jxi ;Z/ D ˛1, so that ki D ki .xi ;Z/ D .˛=	/.i p/,
we have
U ei .;K/ D E

exp

	.i p/˛
	
.i p/C 1
2
	2
˛2
	2
.i p/2˛1

D E

exp

 ˛
2
.i p/2

:
Substituting in the demand function i D .˛x=˛/xi C.˛z=˛/Z and p D  C˛1=2z "
K	=˛, we obtain
U ei .;K/D Eexp

 ˛
2

˛x
˛
xi C ˛z
˛
Z  ˛ 12z "C K	
˛
2
:
Substitute xi D  C˛1=2x i , Z D  C˛1=2z ", and recall that ˛ D ˛x C˛z (thus 
cancels out):
U ei .;K/ D Eexp

 1
2˛

˛
1
2
x i C˛
1
2
z "˛˛
1
2
z "C K	

2
:
Note that ˛1=2z "˛˛1=2z " D ˛1=2z .˛z ˛/" D ˛1=2z ˛x":
(A4) U ei .;K/ D Eexp

 1
2˛

˛
1
2
x i ˛
1
2
z ˛x"C K	

2
:
Since i and " are independent and identically distributed as N.0;1/, the random
component in (A4) is normally distributed around zero with variance .˛1=2xi /2 C
.˛1=2z ˛x/
2 D ˛x C˛2x=˛z D ˛x˛=˛z. We normalize the expression to obtain
U ei .;K/ D Eexp

 ˛x
2˛z

& C K	

r
˛z
˛x˛
2
;
where the new random variable &  N.0;1/. Denoting

D

K	

r
˛z
˛x˛
2
D K
2	2
2

˛x

1C ˛x
˛z

D K
2	2
2

˛x

1C 	
22"
˛x2

D K
2	2
2

˛x C 	
22"
2

;
where we substitute ˛z D ˛2x2=	22" , we observe that &2 follows a noncentral 2
distribution with one degree of freedom and the noncentrality parameter 
. We can
therefore use the moment-generating function Eebz2 D .12b/1=2eb
=.12b/, with
b D ˛x=2˛z D .1=2/	22" =˛x2, for the noncentral 2 distribution. The moment-
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generating function can be derived as follows:
Eebz
2 D 1p
2p
Z
ebz
2
e
.z
p

/2
2 dz D 1p
2p
Z
e
.12b/z22
p

zC

2 dz
D 1p
2p
Z
e
.
p
12bz
p

=.12b//2 

12b
C

2 dz
D 1p
12bp2p
Z
e

b
12b e
.
p
12bz
p

=.12b//2
2 d.
p
12bz/ D 1p
12b e

b
12b :
This moment-generating function can be used to rewrite the utility as
U ei .;K/ D .12b/
1
2 e

b
12b :
The derivative w.r.t.  (denote b0 D @b=@, 
0 D @
=@) is
@U ei .;K/
@
D .12b/ 32 b0e 
b12b  .12b/ 12 e 
b12b

.
b/0.12b/C
b2b0
.12b/2

D .12b/ 32 e 
b12b

b0

1C 

12b

C
0b

< 0;
since b0 >0, b < 0, 
 >0, 
0 <0. To see 
0 < 0, note that
@

@
D 2K
2	2
3

˛x C 	
22"
2

1
C2K
2	2
2

˛x C 	
22"
2

2
	22"
3
D 2K
2	2
3

˛x C 	
22"
2

2
˛x  	
22"
2
C 	
22"
2

D 2˛xK
2	2
3

˛x C 	
22"
2

2
< 0:
Thus, the ex ante utility decreases in .
Regarding the derivative w.r.t. jKj (note @b=@K D 0, 
k D @
=@K2), we have
@U ei .;K/
@K2
D .12b/ 32 e 
b12b .
kb/ > 0;
since b < 0 and 
0 > 0. Thus, the ex ante utility increases in jKj. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
The first-order condition for the cost-minimizing K in (A9) is
@C
@K
D Ef ŒEf Œp
C

@C
@Ef Œp
 @C
@Ef Œr
@Ef Œr
@B
K

@Ef Œp
@K
 @C
@Ef Œr
@Ef Œr
@B
Ef Œp D 0;
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for we have
@C
@K
D Ef ŒEf ŒpEf ŒrEf Œp
C

K Ef ŒrK B @E
f Œr
@B
K

 	
˛

B @E
f Œr
@B
Ef Œp
D Ef ŒEf Œp.1CEf Œr/C 	
˛

1CEf ŒrC @E
f Œr
@B
B

K B @E
f Œr
@B
Ef Œp
D Ef ŒC

	
˛
K Ef Œp

1CEf ŒrC @E
f Œr
@B
B

D Ef ŒC

2
	
˛
K Ef Œ

1CEf ŒrC @E
f Œr
@B
B

D 0:(A5)
To prove that K is positive if I > 0, we show that (A5) is strictly negative for
K  0. That is, issuing more equity reduces capital costs and we have K > 0. For
the following steps, we only require that  2 .0;1/. Hence, we can neglect that 
changes with jKj in the following arguments.
We rearrange the terms of (A5) as follows:
(A6) @C
@K
D 2 	
˛
KEf

1Cr C @r
@B
B

Ef ŒEf

r C @r
@B
B

D 0:
The first term, 2.	=˛/KEf Œ1Cr C.@r=@B/B, is nonpositive for K  0, since we
know (i) from Lemma 1 (debt market equilibrium) that r > 0 and @r=@B > 0, and
(ii) that the revenue constraint implies that B  I > 0 for K  0. The second term
of (A6), Ef ŒEf Œr C .@r=@B/B, is positive as long as K  0, since Ef Œ > 0.
Hence, dC=dK is negative for K  0, implying that the cost-minimizing K is
positive.
It remains to show that B >0 if the financing requirement I is sufficiently high:
It follows from the revenue constraint I D Ef ŒpKCB, the price function Ef Œp D
Ef Œ .	=˛/K, and the assumption Ef Œ > 0 that if B  0, then Ef Œp > 0 and
K >0.11 It therefore follows from (A6) that we have
dC
dK
ˇˇ
ˇˇ
BD0;KDI=Ef Œp
D 2 	
˛
I
Ef Œp
Ef Œ1CrEf ŒEf Œr:
One can now show that, for every given expectation Ef Œ > 0, a sufficiently large
financing requirement I ensures dC=dKjBD0;KDI=Ep > 0. That is, a reduction in K,
which implies an increase in B, reduces capital costs so that B >0.
11 By contradiction, we find that an allocation where Ef Œp < 0 and K < 0, so that
I D Ef ŒpK > 0, is impossible, since we have assumed that Ef Œ > 0, so that Ef Œp D
Ef Œ	K=˛ >0 for K <0, which contradicts the initial assumption that Ef Œp> 0.
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Finally, we show that there are no corner solutions, i.e., that the pair K;B is
finite. We use the revenue constraint to eliminate B from (A5):
D Ef ŒC

2
	
˛
K Ef Œ

1CEf

r C @r
@B
.I KEf Œp/

D Ef ŒC

2
	
˛
K Ef Œ

1CEf

r C @r
@B

I K

Ef Œ 	
˛
K

:(A7)
In equation (A7), K3 has the largest exponent, it has a nonnegative coefficient,
and (A7) is therefore positive in the limit as K ! C1.12 Moreover, we know from
Lemma 2 that (A7) is negative for K  0. The continuity of (A7) then ensures that it
must equal 0 at (at least) one positive finite K, which is a solution to the first-order
condition. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
Proof of Proposition 2 The firm’s survival probability is given by
p D Pr.  0jp/ D Pr.  0jZ/ D Pr.Z ˛1=2z "  0/ Dˆ.˛1=2z Z/ D ˆ

˛x
	"
Z

;
where ˆ./ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. From
Lemma 1 we know dr=dp <0 and therefore
dr
dp
dp
d
D dr
dp


˛x
	"
 C"

˛x
	"
 S 0 if  T 0:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 The first-order derivative,
dC
dK
D @C
@K
C @C
@
@
@K
;
shows that the capital cost minimization problem consists of a direct effect @C=@K
and an indirect effect .@C=@/.@=@K/, which represents how the informational
content of prices changes with the capital structure. Next, we recall Lemma 2, i.e.,
there exist values K > 0 and B > 0 for which @C=@K D 0. We also recall that
K >0 and B >0 represent a global cost minimum.
Consider the firm minimizing expected capital costs:
(A8) min
K;B
C.K;Ef Œp;Ef Œr;/ D min
K;B
.Ef ŒEf Œp/K CEf ŒrB
12 If 2.	=˛/2.@r=@B/D 0, then K has the largest exponent.
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subject to the market system
Ef ŒpK CB D I (revenue constraint),
D .K/ (equilibrium participation),
p D Z  	K
˛
(equity market equilibrium),
r D r.B;/ (debt market equilibrium).
On substituting for the level of debt B D I Ef ŒpK, the problem (A8) becomes
a problem in K alone:
(A9) min
K
C.K;Ef Œp;Ef Œr;/ D min
K;B
.Ef ŒEf Œp/K CEf Œr.I Ef ŒpK/;
where p D p.K;/ is the solution for the equity market equilibrium (A3), and
r D r.I Ef ŒpK;/ is the bond market equilibrium (1).
To prove that firms that internalize the informational externality issue more eq-
uity and less debt, so that K >K, it remains to show that .@C=@/.@=@K/< 0
at K. Put differently, if dC=dKjK D 0C .@C=@/.@=@K/ < 0, the firm issues
more equity and less debt to internalize the informational externality. Regarding
this externality, we note that
@C
@
@
@K
D

@C
@Ef Œp
 @C
@Ef Œr
@Ef Œr
@B
K

@Ef Œp
@
@
@K
C @C
@
@
@K
:
Differentiation of the constraints in (6) yields a more explicit expression:
(A10) @C
@
@
@K
D Ef

1Cr C @r
@B
B

	K2
˛22

˛x C 3˛
2
x
2
	22"

@
@K
CBEf

@r
@
@
@K

:
To sign (A10), we first recall that it follows from Lemma 2 that K > 0, and
hence we know from Proposition 2 that participation is increasing in K, i.e.,
@=@K
jK>0 > 0. Moreover, we recall Lemma 1, which implies that the ex-
pected equilibrium rate of return on debt decreases in the price signal’s precision:
@r=@<0 if the fundamental  is positive. Thus the sign of (A10), at the exogenous
information optimum K where @C=@K D 0, is


1CEf

r C @r
@B
B

	K2
˛22

˛x C 3˛
2
x
2
	22"

„ ƒ‚ …
C
@
@K„ƒ‚…
C
CEf

@r
@
@
@K

B
„ ƒ‚ …

<0;
where the negative sign in (8) is ensured if the financing requirement I is suffi-
ciently high that, by Lemma 2, B is positive. Hence, at the exogenous information
optimum, we have .dC =dK/.K/ < 0, and an increase in K from K towards
K decreases capital costs. Q.E.D.
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A.5 Informational Externality with Budget Constraint
In this section, we derive the informational externality for the modified specifica-
tions given in section 4.3. The capital cost problem
min
K;B
C D min
K;B
Ef Œ. p/K CrB s.t. I D pK CB
is equivalent to
min
K;B
C D min
K;B
Ef

  ˛ 12z "C 	
˛
K

K CrB

s.t. I D pK CB;
min
K;B
C D min
K;B
Ef

	
˛
K2 CrB

s.t. I DpK CB:(A11)
From (A11), we calculate
dC
dK
D Ef

@C
@K
C @C
@
@
@K

;
where the externality .@C=@/.@=@K/ induces firms to issue more equity and less
debt, since13
@C
@
@
@K
D Ef

 	K
2
˛22

˛x C 3˛
2
x
2
	22"

1Cr C @r
@B
B

 @r
@
B

@
@K


r C @r
@B
B

@
@
@
@K
K

< 0:
The first term,
Ef

 	K
2
˛22

˛x C 3˛
2
x
2
	22"

1Cr C @r
@B
B

 @r
@
B

@
@K
<0;
is identical to the effect (8) from the baseline model. The second term,
Ef



r C @r
@B
B

@
@
@
@K
K

<0;
originates from the budget constraint (9). It is negative because we have shown
earlier that r > 0, @r=@B > 0, @=@K > 0, and EŒ@=@ D EŒŒ.@r=@/B=K > 0,
since Ef Œ > 0. Put differently, the reduction in borrowing costs allows us to in-
crease dividends, which increases the price at which shares sell, .@=@/.@=@K/K
> 0. In turn, the firm can sell fewer bonds, which reduces interest expenses r . Fi-
nally, the reduction in borrowing reduces interest costs on the outstanding debt,
.@r=@B/B.
Adding a budget constraint (9) therefore amplifies the conclusion that the firm
issues more equity to internalize the informational externality that stock prices have
on bond yields.
13 Note that Ef Œr D r.p;B/ D r.p..K//;I K CcK2/. Participation  is once
again increasing in K. The proof that information participation increases in K is parallel
to that in section A.2 (once we note that r D r.p/ is known once stocks are traded at
price p).
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